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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN
JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS
DANIEL L. SKOLERt
As courts are indispensable to the administration of criminal justice,
so are lawyers indispensible to court operation for they provide the
occupational specialties required-judges, prosecutors, defense counsel-
and, at least in adult criminal cases, the place of each in the system has
long been recognized. But this has been a decade of special development
and re-definition of the role of counsel for the accused. Blending con-
stitutionally based guarantees with sharpening insights as to the ascendant
importance of legal representation as a catalyst for all procedural rights
and the degree of governmental intervention needed to place rich man
and poor man in de facto parity, the Supreme Court recently has
generated a record of sweeping institutional change in this area.
In 1963, the Supreme Court determined in the landmark case of
Gideon v. Wainwright' that counsel must be furnished in state felony
courts for all indigent defendants. In a series of per curiam rulings and
full opinions following Gideon, it was indicated that this requirement
applied not only at trial but at arraignment,2 possibly at sentencing,' at
preliminary examination,4 in certain circumstances shortly after arrest,
and most recently, in probation revocation proceedings.' Gideon, applic-
able only to felony proceedings on its facts but potentially inclusive of all
criminal proceedings in reasoning and general language," has been
regarded by many as applying to at least serious misdemeanors and has
jDeputy Director, Office of the Law Enforcement Assistance, U.S. Department
of Justice and Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center.
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. Berry v. New York, 375 U.S. 160 (1963); Vecchioli v. Maroney, 372 U.S. 768
(1963); Doughty v. Maxwell, 372 U.S. 781 (1963), vacating Doughty v. Sacks, 173
Ohio St. 407, 183 N.E.2d 368 (1962). See also Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52
(1961) (pre-Gideon capital offense case).
3. Keenan v. Burke, 342 U.S. 881 (1951) ; Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948),
These were pre-Gideon cases, but Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), cited Townsend
with approval as to right to counsel at sentencing in a case asserting the right in a
combined probation revocation-deferred sentencing proceeding.
4. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
5. Mirranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964).
6. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). Where appeal is available as a matter
of right, counsel must likewise be provided to indigent appellants in felony cases.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
7. Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the majority in Gideon, noted that a felony
offense was before the Court but in the discussion and analysis he referred to "criminal
prosecutions" and "persons charged with crime!' rather than felony defendants as such.
372 U.S. 335 passimn (1963).
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been specifically so extended in at least one federal circuit s and several
states.'
With a mandatory and comprehensive right to counsel thus firmly
established for felony courts and on its way to significant recognition in
misdemeanor courts, it was inevitable that the new adult standards would
also be evaluated in juvenile courts.'" One authority, writing shortly
after Gideon for a national conference held in early 1964 on the lawyer's
place in the juvenile court, voiced what many suspected:
I contend that Gideon v. Wainwright... applies by implication
to juvenile court delinquency proceedings, and that it is only a
matter of time before the Supreme Court so applies it specifically. 1
The confrontation came just three years later albeit with some high court
forewarning. 2 In In re Gault," the first Supreme Court decision to
examine the constitutional legitimacy of the peculiar style of operation,
procedure, and theory that has guided the operation of American juvenile
8. McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965); Harvey v. Mississippi, 340
F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
9. Irvin v. State, - Ala. App.- , 203 So. 2d 283 (1967) ; In re Johnson,
62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1965) ; Taylor v. City of Griffin, 113
Ga. App. 589, 149 S.E.2d 177 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1016 (1967) (dictum in
intermediate appellate court) ; People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 207 N.F.2d 358, 259
N.Y.S.2d 413 (1965) [now required by N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722-a (McKinney Supp.
1967) (where misdemeanor carries potential jail penalty)], Braden v. State, 395 S.W.2d
45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965) ; Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash. 2d 733, 409 P.2d 867 (1966).
See also State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz. 130, 392 P.2d 790(1964) ;Patterson v. State, 231 Md.
509, 191 A.2d237 (1963).
Counsel are also provided for misdemeanors by statute or court rule in California,
Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Oregon, Texas, Wisconsin, and other
states. Silverstein, M anpower Requirenents in the Administration of Criminal Justice,
in PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASKC
FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 154 (1967).
10. By 1963, having commenced in the late 1950's, an expanding emphasis on
procedural regularity and protection of legal rights was already well developed within
the juvenile court movement itself. This was reflected in the positions and publications
of the standard-setting professional associations. See STANDARD JUVENILE CT. ACT §
19 (1959) ; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN
JUVENILE COURT (1962). For supplementation by a new and critical interest on the part
of legal writers, see Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Jie venile Courts, 46 CORNELL
L. Q. 387 (1961) ; Beemsterboer, The Juvenile Court-Benevolence in the Star Chamber,
50 J. CR. L.C. & P.S. 464 (1960) ; Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile
Court, 7 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 97 (1961) ; Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender,
41 MINN. L. REv. 547 (1957); Remington, Due Process in Juvenile Proceedings, 11
WAYNE L REv. 688 (1965).
11. Position Statement for Nat'l Conf. on the Role of the Lawyer in Juvenile Court,
Chicago, Ill., Feb. 27-29, 1964 in NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES,
COUNSEL FOR THE CHIILD 1 (1964).
12. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), affirming the necessity of effective
assistance of counsel in waiver proceedings to transfer juvenile cases for trial in adult
criminal courts.
13. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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courts since their inauguration at the turn of the century, 4 the Supreme
Court held, interalia, that Gideon applied at least to the trial stage of the
juvenile process:
[w]e conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine
delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution
in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his
parent must be notified of the child's right to be represented
by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford
counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child. 5
The purpose of this article is to assess the impact of the Gault decision
on the right to counsel and the role of counsel in American juvenile
courts." As detailed questions of scope, impact and role are analyzed,
two pronouncements in Gault, relating, respectively, to the court's dis-
claimer as to the scope of the opinion and its view of the need for and
role of counsel in juvenile court are of particular significance: first,
[w]e do not in this opinion consider the impact of these
constitutional provisions on the totality of the relationship of
the juvenile and the state. We do not even consider the entire
process relating to juvenile "delinquents." For example, we are
not here concerned with the procedures or constitutional rights
applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process nor
do we direct our attention to the post adjudicative or disposi-
tional process. We consider only the problems presented to us
by this case. These relate to the proceedings by which a deter-
mination is made as to whether a juvenile is a "delinquent" as
a result of alleged misconduct on his part with the consequence
14. Juvenile Court Act of April 21, 1899, § 21, [1899] Ill. Laws 137.
15. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
16. The operation of juvenile courts as part of the total system of criminal justice
is frequently overlooked in the tendency of many associated with the court, its develop-
ment, and its advanced rehabilitative philosophy to view the tribunal, in delinquency
proceedings, as something apart from our criminal law and criminal enforcement
apparatus.
Experience has proven that rather than being a departure from the criminal
law, the juvenile court has in effect served as a frontier of the criminal
law. Its pioneer work in the development of probation, diagnostic and
clinical services, and treatment programs has become today's correctional
orthodoxy, finding increasing recognition and acceptance in the field of
adult as well as youth corrections. Its integration of behavioral science
expertise with the traditional regulatory role of the law has taught us much
and periodic reassessment, as evidenced by current emphasis on procedural
fairness and regularity, has helped in this process to preserve both balance
and the essential values of our judicial system.
Skoler, What You Should Know About . .. Juvenile Courts and Young Lawyers, 10
STUDENT LAWYER J., Dec. 1965, at 5, 25.
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that he may be committed to a state institution."t
and second,
[t] he probation officer cannot act as counsel for the child. His
role in the adjudicatory hearing, by statute and in fact, is as
arresting officer and witness against the child. Nor can the
judge represent the child. There is no material difference in
this respect between adult and juvenile proceedings of the sort
here involved. In adult proceedings, this contention has been
foreclosed by decisions of this Court. A proceeding where the
issue is whether the child will be found to be "delinquent" and
subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in
seriousness to a felony prosecution. The juvenile needs the assis-
tance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled
inquiry into facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings,
and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and
submit it. The child "requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him." Just as in Kent
v. United States, supra, at 561-562, we indicated our agreement
with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ditsrict of
Columbia Circuit that the assistance of counsel is essential for
purposes of waiver proceedings, so we hold now that it is equally
essential for the determination of delinquency, carrying with it
the awesome prospect of incarceration in a state institution
until the juvenile reaches the age of 21 P
THaE SCOPE OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Criminal Offenses
Juvenile court laws generally make no distinction between felony
and misdemeanor offenses. They deal with the status of delinquency and
virtually any criminal infraction is sufficient to permit a finding of
delinquency capable of calling forth the complete range of sanctions and
treatment alternatives available for correction and redirection of delin-
quent children."0 Thus under most juvenile court laws as now constituted,
17. 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
18. 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
19. Industrial or training schools are generally the "maximum security" institutions
of the juvenile correctional world. They exist in every state and may be contrasted
with work camps and residential homes which represent intermediate or minimum
security settings for juvenile offenders. Some juvenile court statutes, however, authorize
direct commitment of adjudicated delinquents to adult facilities, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-826(5) (Supp. 1965) (option of direct commitment for delinquent over 16 to
state industrial reformatory); N.Y. FAmiLy CT. AcT § 758(b) (McKinney 1963)
(commitment to adult facility for specified serious felonies).
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no operative distinctions exist between grades or classifications of criminal
conduct for purposes of fourteenth amendment right-to-counsel
guarantees.2"
Non-Criminal Conduct
It is estimated that as many as twenty-five percent of the nation's
judicially handled delinquency cases are based on jurisdictional norms
applicable only to children, i.e., not constituting criminal offenses.2 -
These include such violations as truancy, incorrigible or ungovernable
conduct, curfew violation, and endangering health or morals. Since under
most juvenile court acts the institutional "maximum" can be meted out by
the judge for any of the non-criminal behaviors justifying a delinquency
finding, it is difficult to see, under the Court's reasoning and "institutional
commitment" test, how any difference in right to representation might be
rationalized from the distinction between misdemeanor and non-criminal
conduct as a basis for delinquency adjudications. Thus, the peculiar
dispositional apparatus of the juvenile court, growing largely out of the
demands of its "individualized treatment" rationale, has operated to
extend to juveniles in one all encompassing step possibly the broadest
range of right-to-counsel protection now afforded in any of our criminal
tribunals.
It should be noted that in a few states, a special status distinct from
"delinquency" has been created for children engaged in proscribed non-
criminal conduct.22 The significance of this special classification for
present purposes is that it permits a more limited range of dispositional
handling, usually precluding confinement in state juvenile institutions.
Thus, in New York, a child (boy less than sixteen and girl less than
eighteen) who is habitually truant or incorrigible or beyond parental
authority but has committed no criminal offense may be adjudicated only
20. While many juvenile court acts separately list felony and misdemeanor
offenses in defining jurisdiction, none seem to preclude the possibility of institutionaliza-
tion for even petty misdemeanors. Until recent post-Gaidt amendments, the California
act provided a mandatory right to counsel in felony cases but only a discretionary one
for misdemeanors and non-criminal conduct. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 634 (West
1967). It is interesting to note that the first "across-the-board" guarantee of right-to-
counsel protection in misdemeanor cases should arise not in adult tribunals, where the
Supreme Court has seemed hesitant to make a definitive determination [Winters v.
Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966) and Dejoseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982 (1966)
denying cert. on question of right to counsel in misdemeanor cases)], but rather for
the countless number of petty offenses processed by juvenile courts.
21. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & W-.LF., JUVENIME
CoURT STATISTICs-1965 10 (1966) (sample of 19 courts serving largest cities in
United States indicated 25.5% of judicially handled referrals were for non-criminal
offenses applicable only to children).
22. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 601 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 37, §
702-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-802(d) (1965);
N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acv § 754 (McKinney 1963).
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
as a "person in need of supervision." Such youths may be placed on
probation, in custody of non-parental guardians or welfare agencies, or in
youth facilities for disturbed or neglected children but, in the original
enactment of the current Family Court Act, could not be committed to
state institutions maintained for delinquents or youthful offenders."
Similarly, in Kansas, a child who is "habitually disobedient" or has
deserted his home without good cause, or whose behavior is "injurious
to his welfare" may be placed under juvenile court jurisdiction only as a
"wayward child."2 In such cases, no authority exists to commit the child
to the state industrial school for boys or the state reformatory." In such
jurisdictions, then, the outer limits of Gault may have been reached. The
implications of this are explored in the following discussion of potential
penalty as the prime determinant of representation rights.
Penalty as Determinative of Scope of Right
In delineating the scope of its decision and making its explicit holding
on right to counsel, the Supreme Court made it clear that it was talking
about delinquency proceedings "which may result in commitment to an
institution in which the child's freedom is curtailed."2 However, sooner
or later, consideration must be given to whether or not other dispositional
alternatives represent such substantial curtailments of personal liberty
as to warrant the same procedural protections required by possible com-
mitment to a state training school.2" It is difficult to see where the line
can safely be drawn in dealing with any substantial supervision or treat-
23. N.Y. FAmILY CT. AcT § 754 (McKinney 1963). Shortly after the new Act
became effective in Sept. 1962, it was amended in April 1963 to permit persons in need
of supervision to be placed in state training schools for delinquents. This was an
emergency measure which has been extended from year to year up to the present.
N.Y. FAMImY CT. AcT § 756(d) (McKinney Supp. 1967). These persons may not,
however, be committed to reformatories as is authorized for older delinquents.
Anonymous v. People, 14 N.Y.2d 905, 200 N.E.2d 857, 252 N.Y.S.2d 313, aff'g 20 App.
Div. 2d 395, 247 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1964).
24. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-802(d) (1965).
25. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-826(b) (1965).
26. 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967). In the Court's general pronouncement on the scope of
its holdings, it made the same point but referred to commitment to a "state institution"
reather than to "an institution." 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
27. E.g., extended probation coupled with restraints on the child's freedom of
association, movement, and conduct; placement in foster homes thereby taking the child
out of his parental home for indefinite periods; or placement in special non-residential
schools or community treatment programs for delinquents.
Much has been written concerning the stigma attaching even to such adjudications.
See, e.g., Wheeler, Cottrell, & Romasco, Juvenile Delinquency, Its Prevention and
Control, in PRESIDENT'S CoamI'N ON LAW ENF ORCEMENT & ADmnNISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TAsK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 409, 417 (1967);
Note, itvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79
HARv. L. REv. 775, 799-801 (1966).
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ment program imposed by a juvenile court.28
It may be that, in limiting its holding to dispositional situations
leading to institutional commitment, the court was leaving a way out for
jurisdictions so committed to an informal, non-adversary orientation in
dealing with juvenile offenders as might wish to retain flexibility
even in the matter of appointment of counsel. That is, by adjusting its
juvenile court laws or procedures to preclude the possibility of institution-
alization in the vast majority of cases for which such dispositions are
never intended (primarily first offense and minor offense proceedings),
the jurisdiction might continue to exclude counsel, at least in indigency
situations, to the degree it felt most conducive to effective court operation.
One state has already moved in this direction via amended rules of
court.29
Even assuming the validity of this approach, difficult questions are
presented. Are, for example, all institutional commitments objectionable?
Is an open forestry camp different in this respect from an intermediate
security "training school ?" Is involuntary placement in a state operated
facility for psychologically and socially maladjusted children to be regard-
ed as different from commitment to an institution maintained exclusively
for delinquent offenders? Does a local facility enjoy different status un-
der Gault than a state institution? The New York (prior to 1963) and
Kansas statutes previously cited permit some institutional commitments of
juveniles adjudicated as "persons in need of supervision" or "wayward
children." In New York, a commitment could be made to a "facility of
the division for youth" or an institution maintained by the Commissioner
of Public Welfare and, in Kansas, commitment can be made to a
"detention home, parental home, or farm."3 The new Illinois Juvenile
Court Act has created a "minor in need of supervision" classification
for the non-criminal conduct prohibitions (habitual truancy and beyond
control of parents) but wards so adjudicated may be placed in a variety
28. Courts have already begun to deal with similar issues. See Madera v. Board of
Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.), rev'g 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where a federal
district court saw a prohibited curtailment of personal liberty in special school place-
ments for problem children but was reversed on the preliminary posture of the school
system proceeding in which it sought to require representation by counsel; In re
Goldwyn, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (finding a right to hearing
with counsel on impairment of educational system rights of a student accused of
misconduct).
29. Under N.J. CT. R. 6:3-4(c), 6:9(c)-(d), as amended in 1967, an "informal
calendar" has been authorized to which the juvenile court judge may assign all cases
which, in his opinion, will not result in institutional commitment of the juvenile. Cases,
when so listed, may be conducted in "summary manner" (including processing by a lay
"conference committee" system which has been operative for several years in the state)
and may result in any disposition except commitment.
30. See KAw. GEx. STAT. ANw. § 38-826(b) (1965); N.Y. FAmmy Cr. Acr §§
754(c), 756(a) (McKinney 1963).
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of protective, youth-caring, and local delinquency treatment facilities
separate from the official state institutions, i.e., those maintained by the
Illinois Youth Commission.8 In California, a juvenile charged with
habitual refusal to obey parents, for truancy, or because in "danger of
leading an idle, dissolute or immoral life" may not be committed to the
Youth Authority, the authorized control point for institutional commit-
ment. ie may, however, be committed to a county juvenile home, ranch,
camp, or forestry camp.32 It may well be, indeed it seems likely, that
these "two-track" institutional arrangements will not succeed in avoiding
the requirements of Gault and that only devices like New Jersey's post-
Gault "informal calendar" classification which flatly prohibits commit-
ment of any kind can hope to succeed in reestablishing a discretionary
basis for assignment of counsel to indigent juveniles.3"
Stage of Proceeding-After Arrest
The disclaimers in Gault leave the matter of right to counsel at the
post-arrest and pre-judicial stage open to constitutional definition. How-
ever, the majority opinion lays a strong foundation, in language, reason-
ing, and recognition of the operative facts of the juvenile process, for
application of Miirand, v. Arizona,"4 and Escobedo v. Illinois," to the
apprehended juvenile. For example, the Court, in determining the applic-
ability to juveniles of the privilege against self-incrimination, recognized
the guarantee's pre-judicial scope:
[w] e conclude that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimin-
ation is applicable to juveniles. . . . The participation of
counsel will, of course, assist the police, juvenile courts and
appellate tribunals in administering the privilege ......
as well as the hazards to juveniles at the pre-judicial stage of future
exposure to criminal sanctions either through institutional commitment
in juvenile proceedings or direct processing by adult courts:
31. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3,7 §§ 705-2(b), 705-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).
33. N.J. CT. R. 6:3-4(c), 6:9(c)-(d). An important motivation in promulgating
the amended juvenile court rules may have been a desire to preserve the informality of
the quasi-judicial "juvenile conference committee system" operative in the state in which
groups of youth-serving professionals (lawyers, police, court staff) have handled minor
cases (on voluntary agreement by the child and parents), formulating agreed dis-
positions involving neither institutionalization nor adjudication of delinquency. Rubin,
Volunteers Serve the Court, 15 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 19 (1964). In the Gault opinion, the
Supreme Court undertook to disclaim any applicability of the holding to pre-judicial
conference and treatment procedures falling short of adjudication such as are involved
in New Jersey conference committees and in several recommendations of the President's
Crime Commission (e.g., recommendations as to preliminary conference and consent
decree dispositions). 387 U.S. 1, 31 n.48 (1967).
34. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
35. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
36. 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967.
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[i]n addition, apart from the equivalence ... of exposure to
commitment as a juvenile delinquent and exposure to imprison-
ment as an adult offender, the fact of the matter is that there
is little or no assurance in Arizona, as in most if not all
states, that a juvenile apprehended or interrogated by the
police or even by the juvenile court itself will remain outside
of the reach of adult courts .... In Arizona, as in other states,
provision is made for juvenile courts to relinquish or waive
jurisdiction to the ordinary criminal courts."
It is difficult to reconcile the foregoing, coupled with the Court's
conviction as to the ascendant importance of counsel in implementation
of all procedural rights and the peculiar vulnerability of children to
improper influence, suggestion, and fantasy,"8 with any doctrine which
exonerates police from advising juveniles of right to counsel and provid-
ing counsel when desired at pre-judicial stages. The President's Crime
Commission reports, relied upon heavily by the Court, emphasized the
important screening role played by the police 9 and the fact that arrest
records, as much as court adjudications, lead to "labelling" and other
disabilities generally accorded "delinquents."4
Although the point is not explicitly made by the Court, these "facts
of life" concerning police handling of juveniles would seem doubly
difficult to reconcile with any constitutional argument that counsel was
not, after all, as important to the child in custody as to the adult in
custody. 1
Stage of Proceeding-Detention and Intake
Detention and intake are important pre-judicial stages of the juvenile
37. Id. at 50.
38. Id. at 52-56. There the Court cites In re Four Youths, Nos. 28-776-J, 28-
778-J, 28-783-J, 28-859-J (D.C. Juv. Ct., Apr. 7, 1961) (Judge Ketcham's opinion
discounting the trustworthiness of oral confessions of children in police custody) ; In. re
Carlo & Stasilowicz, 48 N.J. 224, A.2d 110 (1966); In re Gregory W. & Gerald S.,
19 N.Y.2d 55, 224 N.E.2d 102, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1966).
39. PRESIDENT'S Comm'N oN LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 82-83 (1967); TASK FORCE REPORT:
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 27, at 12-14, which refers to the national rate of
police adjustments of juvenile contacts (i.e., without court referral) of forty-five to
fifty percent. See also Note, 79 HARV. L. REv., supra note 27.
40. TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 27, at 39. A few
statutes, like N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 784 (McKinney 1963), apply confidentiality of
records strictures to police as well as court records.
The quasi-judicial hearing procedures conducted by many police agencies to aid
their determination to refer or release have also been criticized. Note, 79 HARv. L. R~v.,
supra note 27, at 779-81.
41. For a recent appellate case extending Gault to police custody and confirming
the application of Miranda to juveniles, see In re William L., - App. Div. 2d
287 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1968).
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justice system. Detention exposes the child to pre-adjudication confine-
ment, usually on the basis of standards relating to community safety, the
child's welfare, or the child's availability for tiral.42 Recent legislation
exhibits a trend toward court hearings for detention decisions, at least as
a follow-up to the initial detention decision by law enforcement officials
or court detention staff.4
3
It may be that the impairment of liberty occasioned by pre-hearing
detention of juveniles falls below the threshold of substantiality necessary
to invoke the mandatory right to counsel recognized in Gault. Certainly,
two weeks of pre-hearing detention is not as serious as the five years of
pre-majority confinement which confronted Gerald Gault at the Arizona
State Training School. But pre-hearing detention has been viewed as
particularly deleterious to juveniles, especially where the only facilities
are adult jail facilities.44 Detention, moreover, is often a form of "intake"
and, as such, may provide additional grounds for urging the necessity of
counsel.
Intake is a special juvenile court term. It refers to the initial
screening stage at which a decision is made concerning what action will be
taken on cases referred to juvenile courts; the options usually are
"adjustment" (closing the case without adjudication) or the filing of a
petition leading to a formal hearing.4 It is truly a "critical stage" for the
juvenile because it determines whether an official record of delinquency
adjudication will become part of his dossier. If the child or his attoreny
achieves success at this stage, no petition is filed, no hearing is held, and
the stigma of adjudicated delinquency is avoided.
An intake referral for petition and court hearing does not, itself,
institutionalize the child which, under Gault, would require access to
42. In the juvenile court system, detention is generally under court control and
not accompanied by the right to bail. NATIONAL CouNciL oF JUVENILE COURT JUDGEs,
JUVENILE COURT JUDGEs DIRECTORY AND MANUAL 339-46 (State Systems Chart III)
(1964) (indicating only six states with right to bail in juvenile proceedings and twelve
states where admission to bail is discretionary). See also D. FREED & P. WALD,
BAIL IN THE UNITED STATEs-1964 93 (1964).
43. See, e.g., CAL. WELT. & INsT'Ns CODE § 135 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 37, § 701-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).
44. It is estimated that for ninety-three percent of the country's juvenile court
jurisdictions, serving 44.3 percent of the population, there is no place for detention
other than the local jail. TASK FoRcE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note
27 at 37. Recent amendments to the California statute specifically provide for appointed
counsel at detention hearings. CAL. WELF. INST'NS CODE § 634 (West 1966).
45. Rosenheim & Skoler, The Lawyer's Role at Intake and Detention Stages of
luvenile Court Proceedings, 11 CuME & DELINQUENCy 167 (1965) ; Sheridan, Juvenile
Court Intake, 2 J. FAmILY L. 139 (1962). Intake adjustments have rather constantly
accounted for disposition of about half of all cases referred to juvenile courts. See,
e.g., JUVENILE COURT STATisTcs-1965, supra note 21. Rates vary sharply in individual
jurisdictions. For adult derivatives, see Miller & Remington, Procedures before Trial,
ANNALs Jan. 1962, at 111.
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counsel. However, this step has been thought serious enough to call
forth the "guiding hand" for adults.46 Any distinction in the treatment
of children would need to be rooted in the mystique of the intake process,
i.e., whether with family and without counsel, more assistance can be
provided to children passing through intake due to increased flexibility
than would be possible were counsel present to force the issue of court
referral. In this regard, it is interesting to note that prevailing standards
of good court practice suggest a formal proceeding when, at intake, the
child refuses normal cooperation or questions the existence of a prima
facie case, i.e., fails to concede his involvement.47
It may well be that the desired openness of the intake interview can
be maintained with counsel present at least where, as under some
statutes, admissions made by the juvenile may not be used at the hear-
ing," and where the intake staff can rely on some form of legal advice
to cope with defense counsel's contentions of a technical nature. On the
other hand, mere exclusion of intake statements as evidence at the
hearing would seem inadequate to obviate the need for counsel since the
critical determination of whether to close the case by adjustment or
to proceed to adjudication still remains a part of the process. Balancing
such considerations, the case seems strong for extending of Gault to this
important procedural stage.
Pre-Trial Preparation and the Adjudication
Right to counsel at the adjudication stage necessarily includes the
right to have counsel appointed sufficiently in advance of the hearing to
allow for adequate pre-trial preparation. The Court has made clear that
assistance of counsel at a critical stage of proceedings, such as the
adjudication hearing or the waiver hearing, means "effective assistance
of counsel." '49 Thus where appointment takes place at the commencement
of the hearing, it is obvious that a reasonable opportunity to prepare
could not be denied. In juvenile courts which conduct initial hearings in
the nature of arraignments after the filing of a petition but before the
hearing on the merits, effective assistance of counsel would also seem
critical and the adult analogy applicable."0
46. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (right to counsel -i preliminary
examination).
47. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY & NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, GUIDES FOR JUVENILE COURT JUDGES 39 (1963) (criteria for
intake selection of cases to be handled judicially).
48. N.Y. FAmILY CT. ACT § 735 (McKinney 1963) (statements made at pre-
liminary conferences) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §703-8(5) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).
49. It re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) ; Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554
(1966).
50. See discussion of representation at initial hearing in Dorsen & Reznick, In re
Gault and the Future of JItvenile Law, FAm. L. Q., Dec. 1967, at 1, 17.
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The Disposition Stage
"Disposition" refers to the juvenile court's action in prescribing
appropriate penalties or treatment for an adjudicated delinquent. In most
jurisdictions, it represents the final stage of the juvenile court "trial,"
but in a significant number, due to the recent revisions of many juvenile
court acts, it must be conducted as a separate hearing following the
adjudication hearing."
Disposition is normally based on an intensive probation study or
"social history" prepared by the court probation or social service staff; it
is considered by many to be the most significant stage of the juvenile
court hearing process. It is frequently cited as a major example of
divergence from adult procedures in its acute focus upon the child's
needs, background, and personality and upon an appropriate corrective
plan for the delinquent youngster. 2
Does the juvenile offender have a constitutionally protected right to
counsel at the disposition stage? Due process for adults appears to require
representation by counsel in sentencing proceedings, at least where a
danger exists that untrue assumptions about the offender's record,
rehabilitation potential, etc., will affect or be considered in the sentencing
decision."3 Since the majority of juvenile delinquency hearings involve
pleas of guilty, it is clear that for most adjudicated delinquents, the
disposition decision may be the most critical stage of all and thus the one
most urgently requiring an advocate for the child.
Appeal and Collateral Attack
The Gault opinion is silent on the right to counsel in appeals from
juvenile court determinations. Indeed, it declined to deal with Gault's
contention that Arizona procedure denied a constitutionally protected
right to appellate review and a transcript of proceedings." The Court
noted prior holdings that states were not constitutionally required to pro-
vide appellate courts or an opportuntiy for appellate review5 but ex-
pressed concern with the burdens imposed upon habeas corpus machinery
51. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701.10, 705-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); N.Y.
FAMILY CT. ACT §§ 742, 746 (McKinney 1963) (both statutes permit hearings to be
held consecutively without any time interval between them). See the general recom-
mendation of the National Crime Commission that separate adjudication and disposition
hearings be adopted by all juvenile courts. CHALLENGE OF CaIE IN A FREE SOCIETY,
supra note 39, at 87.
52. See GUIDES FOR JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, supra note 47, at 68-88; P. TAPPAN,
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 251-86 (1949).
53. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948). Cf. United States v. Behrens, 375
U.S. 162 (1963) (error for court to fix final sentence "in the absence of respondent
and his counsel") ; Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1240 (1951).
54. 387 U.S. 1, 58 (1967).
55. Id. The Court cites Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
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by lack of such rights. In the context of right to counsel, however, the
question is whether, given the right to appellate review under the state
law, local courts may safely ignore the mandate of Gault and decline to
afford representation for this purpose. It is difficult to see how they could
do so."0 The constitutional right to counsel on appeal, firmly extablished
in adult proceedings,57 is rooted conceptually in the important nature of
the appeal and, as to indigent defendants,in"equal protection" status. The
Court, despite its Kent v. United States"8 and Gault disclaimers, appears
to have served ample warning that it will not stint in measuring the right
to counsel against the important incidents of juvenile court procedure:
"[t] he right to representation by counsel is not a formality. It is not a
grudging gesture to a ritualistic requirement. It is of the essence of
justice."5 Collateral attack should stand on no different ground.
Parole and Probation Revocation
In a recent case, the Supreme Court has extended the Gideon rule
to probation revocation hearings."0 The need for counsel at this stage,
judged by the substantiality of the penalty faced in such proceedings, was
well developed in the opinion and would seem equally applicable in
juvenile cases absent some superior capacity for equity and accuracy on
the part of juvenile parole and probation authorities not possessed by
adult authorities.
In some jurisdictions, both parole and probation revocation are in
the hands of youth authorities or other administrative agencies, or are
handled by a non-judicial court staff. The Gault representation mandate
would seem here to call for counsel in whatever decisional process is
operative, and, in addition, may require formal hearing rights not
previously recognized in such administrative proceedings to insure effec-
tive representation by counsel.
Transfer to Adult Courts61
The juvenile court laws of most states are structured so that
56. One not uncommon form of appeal from juvenile court adjudications is the
trial de novo in a court of general jurisdiction. This is usually found where juvenile
court jurisdiction is lodged in minor courts and thus made subject to review in the
manner of other minor cases. Applicability of Gault rights in this kind of procedure
seems clear and direct. See B. GEORGE, GAULT AND THE JUVENILE COuRT REvOLUTION
50 (1968).
57. Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963).
58. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
59. Id. at 561.
60. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (involving two cases under local pro-
cedure which permitted imposition of deferred sentences upon violation of conditions
of probation).
61. See Schornhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Kent Revisited,
43 IND. L.J. 583 (1968).
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juvenile offenders who commit serious crimes or who are not deemed fit
subjects for juvenile court processing may be tries in regular criminal
courts. Provision is made for this in a variety of ways. In some states,
certain major crimes are expressly excluded from juvenile court juris-
diction. 2 In other states, the judge is given discretion, subject to
certain limitations," to "waive" jurisdiction or "transfer" cases for trial
in adult courts and, in a few states, this function is placed solely in the
hands of the prosecutor or the criminal court.6
In Kent v. United States,"5 the Supreme Court considered proce-
dural rights in waiver proceedings and determined that the outcome of
the proceeding was of such critical importance to the child as to require
a full measure of basic procedural protection-the right to a hearing, to
representation by counsel, and to judicial specification of the basis of
any transfer order. Kent, however, was decided on the basis of the
District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act 6 and prior interpretative case
law. Thus the question of the constitutional right to counsel in waiver
proceedings, prior to Gault, might have been considered unresolved
despite declarations in the Kent opinion that seemed to belie its statutory
rationale:
... there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result
of such tremendous consequences without ceremony-without
hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a state-
ment of reasons."
Gault, however, should have dispelled what doubt remained. The oppor-
tunity for hearing and representation now seems clearly a due process
requirement in a waiver proceeding to subject juveniles to prosecution
as an adult.
Waiver of Right to Counsel
One of the greatest uncertainties remaining in the wake of Gault is
62. E.g., DL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 957, 1159 (1953) ("capital felony"); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 208.170(1) (1962) ("murder or rape"); L. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570
A(5) (1968) ("capital crime" and "attempted aggravated rape") ; Miss. CODE ANN. §
7185-15 (1953) (offense "punishable by life imprisonment or death").
63. These limitations are usually based upon a minimum age or the seriousness
of the offense charged.
64. For a complete listing of the various "transfer" provisions, see JuvENux
COURT JuDGEs DnECTORY AND MANUAL, supra note 42, at 206-37 (State Systems Chart
II).
65. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
66. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-1501 to -1589 (Supp. V, 1966).
67. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966). States have split on whether
Kent v. U.S. imposes a constitutional right to counsel in transfer or waiver hearings.
For cases applying the right, see Summers v. State, 230 N.E.2d 320 (Ind. 1967) ; Knott
v. Langlois, 231 A.2d 767 (R.I. 1967); State v. Yoss, 225 N.E.2d 275 (Ohio 1967);
Contra State v. Hance 233 A.2d 326 (Md. 1967) ; State v. Acuna, 428 P.2d 658 (1967).
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whether a juvenile defendant's right to counsel may be waived and, if so,
what constitutes a valid waiver."8 In determining that mere knowledge
that a lawyer could have been retained did not constitute a waiver by
Gerald Gault or his mother of their right to counsel, the majority opinion
suggested that waiver was possible under proper circumstances:
[t]hey had a right expressly to be advised that they might
retain counsel and to be confronted with the need for specific
consideration of whether they did or did not choose to waive the
right. If they were unable to afford to employ counsel, they
were entitled in view of the seriousness of the charge and the
potential commitment, to appointed counsel unless they chose
waiver. 9
Given the possibility of a valid waiver" there would seem to be
wisdom in requiring more stringent standards for its effective exercise
than in the case of adult defendants. Such standards, in addition to
mandatory explanations of the right and emphasis on its careful con-
sideration, could go beyond adult treatment in important ways. For
example, courts might insist that both the child and parents agree to the
waiver and if either refused there could be no effective waiver."'
This would be an easily measurable standard and would afford recogni-
tion to the special vulnerability and protective needs of the juvenile
defendant. Similarly, it might be determined that no waiver was possible
where the child's interests in the proceeding were opposed to those of the
guardian or parent, e.g., a family-directed offense or charge initiated by a
parent.
There is no reason why due process for juveniles need only equal and
not go beyond that accorded adults. Indeed, proponents of the juvenile
court system have often been insistent in claiming the necessity of special
care beyond that accorded adults7" and this position, where soundly based
in the realities of juvenile disability, might well be extended to procedural
rights.
68. It is interesting that the Court refused to consider the child as
inherently incapable of waiving the right to counsel in view of its apparently sympathetic
recognition of authority suggesting appointment of counsel as a matter of course injuvenile cases "without requiring any affirmative choice by child or parent" and of its
emphasis on the inherently untrustworthy character of juvenile statements and testimony,
whether or not voluntary. THE CHALLENGE OF CI!E IN A FREE SocIEry, supra note
39, at 86, cited in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 38 n.65 (1967).
69. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42 (1967).
70. One recent case has held that both the child and the parent must waive. In re
William L., - App. Div.2d , 287 N.Y.S2d 218 (1968) (Miranda warnings
given only to child and not mother were defective).
71. See Alexander, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court, in JUSTIcE FOR THE
CIn. 82, 88 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
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The need for stringent standards in waiver proceedings is illustrated
by certain reported tendencies of post-Gault practice:
[e]xperience may prove that the Achilles heel of the Gault
opinion is the court's failure to set standards for waiver of
defined rights. Fragmentary reports from several areas of the
country suggest that because of the added administrative
burdens involved, some courts are strenuously persuading
juveniles not to exercise their newly acquired constitutional
guarantees.... When the wisdom of a waiver, looked at from
the juvenile's point of view, seems dubious, the juvenile court
should reject it, appoint counsel and ensure that these rights are
exercised. 2
In New York, a state with perhaps the strongest and most sweeping
statutory provision for mandatory notice of right to counsel and appoint-
ment of counsel in delinquency cases," representation is apparently
waived in more than half of all cases adjudicated outside New York
City (where an aggressive appointment program is operative)." Failure
to make use of available counsel is probably even greater elsewhere,
fostered no doubt in large part by the practice among some probation
staffs of suggesting to the juvenile that appointment of counsel has no
tangible benefit, and may even be a detriment leading to delay or judicial
disapproval.7 ' The Supreme Court will undoubtedly be called upon to
further delineate requirements for waiver of counsel in juvenile pro-
ceedings, and its determinations should have a critical effect on the de
facto rate of representation in juvenile cases.
72. Ketcham, Guidelines from Gault: Revolutionary Requirements and Reappraisal,
53 VA. L. REV. 1700, 1712 (1967). Cf Position Statement, supra note 11, at 2, which
states:
Far from being weaker than in adult criminal proceedings, the argument in
favor of the right to counsel is stronger in juvenile proceedings. It has long
been accepted that the juvenile lacks the legal competence to take many
steps that would bind him if he were an adult .... His presumed 'incom-
petence' in contracts is difficult to reconcile with the notion that when
brought into the juvenile court, he has the competence to waive his right
to counsel. Counsel is required in juvenile cases even where the child states
that he does not want a lawyer to represent him.
73. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT. §§ 249, 727, 741 (McKinney 1963).
74. JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT
289 (1967), showing representation for the judicial year 1965-66 in only 41 percent of
delinquency proceedings heard outside New York City (95 percent in New York City).
75. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CRIME IN THE DIsTRIcT OF
COLUMBIA 646 (1966), indicating the execution of waiver forms by 85-90 percent of the
juveniles and their families appearing at preliminary hearings in the D.C. Juvenile Court.
Two States applying Kent 'v. U.S. to transfer and waiver hearings have refused to do so
retroactively. Smith v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W. 2d 256 (Kent 1967) ; In re Harris 2
CIm. L. RPR. 2245 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1967).
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Retroactivity of Right To Counsel
Gault's most direct antecedent in the right to counsel area, the
Gideon decision, was applied retroactively"' and a number of state courts
seem to be following a similar course with respect to Gault's require-
ments." However, courts in at least two states have held otherwise,"8
based on local interpretation of criteria for retroactive application recently
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Stovall v. Denno.9
It is difficult to see retroactive application in Gault as critical to
either the proper introduction of the new rules on right to counsel or to
redress any substantial number of injustices in past adjudications. The
juvenile court has, in most states, been a tribunal in which both pro-
secution and defense were absent. Thus the system was largely adjusted to
absence of representation and compensated for it by the roles assumed by
the judge and staff. This is not meant to justify the status quo but rather
to suggest that the Court's Stovall v. Denno0 standards, which examine
the purpose of new constitutional interpretations, past reliance on existing
law, and the effect that retroactivity might have on administration of
criminal justice, would seem to leave room for local determinations
against retroactivity. The fact that Gault encompassed more than right to
counsel and went into areas where the Supreme Court has not found it
necessary to impose retroactivity, e.g., police warnings in regard to self-
incrimination, would also seem persuasive to the case for leaving judg-
ments in this area to reasonable local discretion.
IMPACT AND ROLE OF COUNSEL
Three aspects of the institutional influence of the Gault representa-
tion guarantee will be examined: (1) legal manpower requirements,
(2) impact on proceedings and personnel, and (3) the role of counsel
for the child.
Manpower Requirements
In admittedly rough projections, the President's Crime Commission
estimated that the current amount of legal services required for adequate
76. Arthur v. Colorado, 380 U.S. 250 (1965); Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S.
2 (1963).
77. In re Billie, 6 Ariz. App. 65, 429 P.2d 699 (1967) ; Marsden v. Commonwealth,
- Mass. -, 227 N.E2d. 1 (1967). For a discussion of Gault retroactivity, see
1 NATIONAL CouNciL OF JUVENILE CouRT JUDGES, JUVENILE CouRT DIGEST, Nov.
1967, at 2-4.
78. Cradle v. Peyton, 208 Va. 243, 156 S.E.2d 874 (1967) ; Reick v. Hershman, 1
CRIM. L. Rm,. 2153 (Waukesha County Ct., Wisc., June 1, 1967).
79. 38 U.S. 293 (1967) (participation in police lineup identification without
advice of counsel-retroactivity denied).
80. Id.
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representation of adult defendants in all criminal cases except traffic
offenses8 would be equivalent to the full time annual services of between
8,300 and 12,500 lawyers. 2 No projections were made for representa-
tion in delinquency cases. However, following Commission calculations,
using the latest Children's Bureau statistics, assuming a yearly representa-
tion capacity for the individual lawyer somewhere between the Com-
mission's felony and misdemeanor estimates, i.e., 500 juvenile court cases
per year, and conservatively estimating an incidence of indigency offset
by waivers which would require assigned counsel or defender representa-
tion in fifty percent of all judicially handled delinquency cases, Gault
might be expected to require the annual equivalent of 700 to 750 years of
full time lawyer services in the nation's juvenile courts.83 This pro-
jection, which largely ignores representation in cases not proceeding to
the formal petition and hearing stage may be considered conservative,
and, of course, the actual number of lawyers needed to provide this level
of services would be larger than the lawyer-year estimate, perhaps several
times greater.
In a 1954 survey of juvenile court judges serving in the nation's
largest cities, it was estimated that lawyers appeared on behalf of children
in no more than five to ten percent of the delinquency cases heard in most
courts studied.8' Even assuming an appropriate increase in this ratio
in the years intervening between the survey and Gault, it appears that
Gault will quite likely occasion a three to five fold increase in the general
incidence of lawyer representation in juvenile courts, the exact amount
depending on waiver experience. This represents an unusual impact upon
ongoing operations which should produce correlative strains upon work-
loads, budgets, length of case disposition, and manpower levels of other
81. I.e., felonies, misdemeanors, appeals, collateral attacks and revocation proceed-
ings.
82. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTs, supra note 9, at 57. Using this manpower
estimate (assuming indigent representation at fifty percent of the total man-year figure
and $25,000 per attorney), the report estimated a national budget between $84 and $158
million per year to cover all indigent representation needs. For further analysis of
manpower needs, see REPORT OF THE CONFERENcE ON LEGAL MANPOWER NEEDS OF
Cxim-NAL LAw (1966) in 41 F.R.D. 389, 392-404.
83. The 500 per man-year caseload may seem high, but experience has shown an
even greater capacity in defender-type offices serving juvenile courts. The 19-attorney
"law guardian" complement from the New York Legal Aid Society which is responsible
for all indigent representation in the New York City Family Court handled approximate-
ly 13,000 juvenile court cases in 1965 (11,000 involving delinquency or similar charges)
for an average load of about 670 cases per year. TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
74, at 289.
84. Skoler & Tenney, Attorney Representation in Juvenile Court, 4 3. FAMILY L.
77 (1964). Cf. Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welf., Survey of
Juvenile Courts and Probation Services in TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY,
supra note 27, at 82 (Table 16) (confirming estimate of frequency of representation
below ten percent in most courts).
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court personnel. Quantification of such impact is virtually impossible
without further experience or without the application to specific court
systems of involved simulation and modelling techniques.8 The cal-
culations, while only approximations, have been made to illustrate the
degree of institutional change which the Gawit mandate can be expected
to bring to the juvenile court in the next few years.
Impact on Proceedings and Personnel
Perhaps the most immediate effect of the new right to counsel will
be to increase the stresses upon what has historically been for most
jurisdictions a court without prosecutors."6 Evidence of the imbalance
created by the presence of counsel for the accused with no attorney
representing the state has already been obtained in experience under the
New York law guardian system, particularly in New York City where
juveniles are now represented by counsel in over ninety-five percent of
petitioned cases." The dilemma is a real one:
[1]aw Guardians have been provided to defend the rights
of children, and appropriations for their cost are made in
budget of each appellate Division. . . . No similar provision
is made for the presentation of cases alleging delinquency.
As a result of this situation, the Court is all too often
required to question complaining witnesses on the basis of the
petition and then have the Law Guardians exercise the right
and duty of cross examination. Such a procedure does not
provide for adequate preparation or presentation of the testi-
mony against the child. It also places the Court in the untenable
position of having to seek the facts on which a petition of
delinquency is based, hear the defense, and then undertake to
evaluate and pass on the evidence as a judge.88
Adjustments have already been made by regular assignment of
New York City Police Department and Board of Education counsel to
present at least the more important cases. In Connecticut, to meet similar
needs, a system of "court advocates" has been established to present
delinquency cases for the state. However, almost all juvenile court
judges have, at some time, felt an uncomfortable pull toward the state's
85. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT & ADIMINISTRATION OF JUST-
IcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 39-44, Appendix I (1967) ; Taylor &
Navarro, An Application of Systems Analysis to Aid in the Efficient Administration of
Justice, 51 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 47 (1967).
86. Skoler & Tenney, supra note 84, at 83-84 (regular representation of state in
delinquency proceedings in less than fifteen percent of courts surveyed).
87. TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 289.
88. In re Land, 44 Misc. 2d 900, 904, 255 N.Y.S.2d 987, 991 (1965).
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position when defense counsel has elicited a one-sided development of the
facts with no one to intervene but the judge. Thus, full realization of the
values of adversary representation may require an advocate for the state
to assure both proper presentation of cases and a judiciary free of
advocate responsibilities.
The impact of Gault on the role and behavior of court probation or
social service staff is also likely to be substantial. Traditionally viewed as
impartial investigators, diagnosticians, and court advisors, probation
personnel may find themselves more in the position of advocates for the
state's interests and less for the child's welfare, at least to the extent that
these appear to conflict. This no doubt will be an unwanted posture at
odds with professional inclination and training. It will not, of course, ex-
tend to the social casework and treatment efforts of such professionals
once disposition has been made. Nevertheless, in the disposition decision
process, it is a position which may freqently be impelled, and has already
been felt, 9 as lawyers provide the sophistication and articulation neces-
sary to make effective challenges to the social histories, diagnostic
findings, and corrective plans developed by probation staff. The some-
times uncomfortable presence of counsel should also enhance the accuracy,
documentation, and responsibility of probation staff work, hopefully
without impairing the basic social work orientation, valuable skills, and
concern contributed by such personnel to the juvenile court process."0
It has been suggested that any significant increase in juvenile
representation will further congest already overloaded court dockets
because additional time will be required to process cases where evidence,
disposition data, and recommendations are subject to scrutiny of counsel.
This indeed appears to be the case but not in the degree feared by some.9
Moreover, the more deliberate pace imposed by adversary proceedings
may have a salutory countereffect. Courts, like administrative agencies,
tend to adjust to their capacities. That is, if only a given number of cases
can be handled under the rules and resources of a particular system,
89. Paulsen, The Expanding Horions of Legal Services-II, 67 W. VA. L. R.Ev.
267, 270, 275 (1965) (discussion of friction experienced between New York law guardians
and probation staff in disposition hearings).
90. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T DF HEALTH, EDuc., & WELF., STANDARDS FOR
JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT 106-110 (discussion of probation staff). For an interesting
study of the different values and working styles characteristic of the professions at work
in juvenile courts (judges and lawyers, social workers, police), see Walther & McCune,
Juvenile Court Judges in the U.S-Working Styles and Characteristics, 11 CRIME &
DELINQUENcY 384 (1964).
91. Judges of the New York City Family Court (there are now 34), operating with
lawyers present in almost all delinquency cases, maintain annual disposition rates
comparing favorably with full-time family court judges elsewhere in the state where
representation rates are much lower, and with juvenile court judges in states where
representation is infrequent.
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administration moves toward limiting intake so that only such number
will be accommodated. Being compelled by Gault to handle a smaller
volume of hearings with greater selectivity should require more wide-
spread resort to informal disposition techniques, an area offering perhaps
the best potential for early diversion of career patterns of law violation,
the voluntary acceptance of help by problem adolescents, and avoidance
of the harmful effect of a delinquency label."
Role of Counsel
The attorney in juvenile court can, as with representation of adults
in criminal cases, play an active and constructive role at virtually all
stages of proceedings. As outlined in a recent treatise:
1. At the pre-hearing stage, he can represent the child and
his family at intake interviews, to help clarify whether
jurisdictional requisites are met and there is sufficient
evidence (i.e., a prima facie case) to warrant the filing
of a formal petition. He can also present the family's posi-
tion in detention hearings and determinations and explore
possibilities of informal adjustment of the case, and the
conditions thereof, without the necessity of formal petition
and hearing.
2. At adjudication, he can insure observance of the child's and
family's legal rights, present evidence and cross-examine
witnesses, make objections to improper evidence and testi-
mony, and see that the child's position is fully presented.
3. In disposition, the lawyer can present evidence bearing on
the treatment decision, question facts developed in social
reports, and serve as spokesman in presenting the child's
and family's view of a proper disposition and any alterna-
tive plans they may wish to present for court consideration.
4. In post-hearing stages, the attorney can pursue appeals
from any determinations deemed erroneous, represent the
child in probation revocation proceedings or proceedings to
change the terms of probation or otherwise alter the court's
prior dispositions.9"
92. Reference to the findings and recommendations of the President's Crime
Commission reveals heavy reliance on pre-judicial handling and treatment for effective
inroads on juvenile crime, e.g., major recommendations for establishment of youth
services bureaus, enlarged use of preliminary conferences, and employment of consent
decrees to dispose of juvenile cases short of adjudication. TEE CifALLENGE OF CRI
IN A FREE SOcIETY, supra note 39, at 83-84.
93. STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY CouRTs, supra note 90, at 113. For a
valuable compilation of writings exploring the role, function, and significance of lawyer
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None of these roles would seem unfamiliar to the attorney engaged
in criminal practice and yet, as juvenile courts have operated in most
jurisdictions," much of the process might appear alien to attorneys
maldng initial contact with the court. Gault, in its guarantees of notice,
confrontation, the privilege against self-incrimination, and right to coun-
sel will, if anything, render juvenile court procedure more understandable
to such practitioners.
It has been suggested, however, that juvenile court representation,
consistent with the court's special concerns for the best interests and
redirection of children, involves more than journeyman representation of
adult defendants. This has long been the view of those associated with
the juvenile court movement 5 and has been expressed in recent literature
in terms of a somewhat complex "advocate-guardian-officer of the
court" mission" or, more functionally, a responsibility for supplementing
counsel's historical role as a developer of facts, protector of client rights,
and advocate against the state's contentions with new duties."T Perhaps
the greater dilemma presented by such role enlargements is the extent
to which they should temper the lawyer's traditional duty "to present
every defense that the law of the land permits" or, more simply, to win
his case or help secure the lightest possible penalty or sanctions for his
client's wrongdoing.9
In the traditional notion of the juvenile court as a substitute parent
seeking to provide the juvenile with the "treatment" necessary to secure
his correction and fullest development, a lawyer who entered the process
representation in juvenile courts, see INsTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION,
CHILDREN IN THE CouRTs-THE QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION (Shapiro & Newman ed.
1967).
94. E.g., a considerable measure of informality, the absence of prosecutors, intake
and "plea bargaining" discretion in the court itself, and a close and vital interdepend-
ence between judges and probation staff in both adjudication and disposition.
95. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 71; Molloy, Jutvenile Court: A Labyrinth of
Confusion for the Laywer, 4 ARIZ. L. REv. 1 (1962). A comprehensive research and
demonstration project seeking to test and examine assumptions and roles in juvenile
court representation is now being conducted by the National Council of Juvenile Court
Judges under a Ford Foundation grant. See LEFsTEiN & STAPLETON, COUNSEL IN
JuvENILE COURTS: AN EXPERIBIENTATAL STUDY (mono. 1967).
96. Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New Family
Court, 12 BUF. L. REv. 501 (1963); Schinitsky, The Role of the Lawyer in Children's
Court, 17 REcoan OF N.Y.C.B.A. 10 (1962).
97. The latter concept would give prominence to such responsibilities as inter-
pretation of the court's approach and goals to juvenile offenders and their parents, and
securing their cooperation in the court's disposition. Skoler & Tenney, supra note 84, at
91-93.
98. See Lefstein, In re Gadt, Juvenile Courts and Lawyers, 53 A.B.A.J. 811,
812-813 (1967) (discussion of dilemmas presented in juvenile court representation in
regard to philosophy of court vs. canons of legal ethics). In re Bacon, 240 Cal. App.
2d 34, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1966), included a complaint that the juveniles' counsel had
gone too far in cooperating with probation staff, in effect acting as agents of the court
and depriving the juveniles of competent counsel.
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was often viewed as most helpful when willing to join with the court in
securing from the youth acknowledgement of responsibility for delinquent
behavior, if such were the case, and cooperating in the imposition of
substantial supervision or perhaps even institutional confinement when
needed to effect rehabilitation. However, Gault tends to de-emphasize
this kind of participation as the primary obligation of defense counsel.
The current inabilities of the system to deliver on its therapeutic rationale
suggest that the refocusing may be a wise move." In explicit efforts to
come to grips with these difficult problems, falling back on traditional
concepts of adversary representation, in the most responsible sense, seems
to offer the most sensible point of departure. Certainly this does not
preclude advice by attorneys concerning the importance of accepting
responsibility for misconduct and even accepting sanctions calculated to
help the juvenile offender. What it does seem to require, however, is that
in juvenile court, as elsewhere, the lawyer owes a duty to present all
defenses and seek the results desired by his client when he appears on
the child's behalf.
A special role problem confronting counsel in delinquency cases
derives from the dual interests of child and parents.' 0 Gault does little
to shed light on the variations in parent-child interest that might bear on
representation rights in juvenile proceedings. In narrowest terms, it would
seem reasonable to conclude that Gault, by virtue of the limitation of sixth
and fourteenth amendment guarantees to the "accused," guarantees the
right to counsel only to the juvenile and not his parents. Thus, where the
interests of child and parent diverge, as where the complaint is initiated
by a parent, or even where important disagreements arise, such as to
responsibility for or the essential facts of the misconduct, it would seem
that the allegiance of constitutionally appointed counsel must lean toward
the juvenile. This, of course, is a delicate area for counsel and little benefit
99. The Supreme Court in Gaidt made clear its views as to the juvenile court's
inability to fully meet initial promises. 387 U.S. 1, 21-23 & n.30 (1967). See Ketcham,
The Unfulfilled Promise of the Jitvenile Court, 7 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 97 (1961) ;
Note, Rights & Rehabilitation in. Juvenile Courts, 67 CoLUm. L. REv. 281, 320 (1967)
(impact of judicial process on rehabilitation).
100. In the survey of juvenile court judges previously cited, inquiry was made as
to who was represented most often in delinquency cases. The majority of the responding
judges (fifty-two percent) indicated "child and parents jointly" and a lesser number
(fourty-four percent) representation of the "child alone." The researchers found this
revealing:
[i]t is interesting to note how many judges viewed delinquency appearances
as representation of "child and parents jointly" although, technically, it is
only the child against whom a delinquency petition is filed and who would
require legal defense. The fact that judges saw such representation as on
behalf of both child and parents probably comports with the realities of the
situation and the loyalties of the family retained lawyer, even if beyond the
demands of the proceeding.
Skoler & Tenney, supra note 84, at 82-83.
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would be derived from impairment of family unity or loyalties by
unnecessary disregard of parental concerns. Indeed, Gault makes it clear
that parents are important instrumentalities, along with counsel, for
protection of the child's procedural rights. Their role or involvement is
specifically mentioned in connection with notice of right to counsel,
waiver of such right, and exercise of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.' Whether in conflict of interest situations a court must appoint
counsel for the parents as well as the child would seem to be a matter for
local determination. Some juvenile court acts which specifically provide
for appointment of counsel in indigency situations seem broad enough
to permit this result.'
A final issue that merits consideration is whether only legally
trained counsel can meet the constitutional requisites of juvenile court
representation. Particularly at the disposition stage, where difficult judg-
ments as to courses of treatment or behavior modification are in con-
tention, it might be questioned whether lawyers offer the best combination
of skills for effective representation of the child's interests. A recent case
raised just this question in considering a claim of right to counsel in a
school disciplinary proceeding..' and one scholar has attracted much
attention with a proposal to staff an adversary juvenile court trial system
entirely with professionally trained non-lawyer personnel.' The writer
makes a persuasive case in terms of training, commitment, and staffing
feasibility for substitution of the social worker for the attorney as
juvenile court advocate. The existence of highly professional juvenile
court systems manned by lay judges, as in England, gives further
pause as Gault operates to inject not merely a trained advocate, but a
discipline perhaps not optimally suited for the role, into the treatment
milieu of the juvenile court.
The case, of course, can be overstated. Adjudicative hearings,
101. 387 U.S. 1, 41-42, 55 (1967).
102. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 634 (West 1966) (specifically
authorizing dual appointment in conflict of interest situations); IDAHEO CODE ANN. §
16-1631 (1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.25(5)-(6) (1957). Other statutes specifically
limit appointment appointment in delinquency cases to counsel for the child. N.Y.
FAMILY CT. AcT § 246 (McKinney 1963) ; OE. REv. STAT. § 491.494 (1967).
103. Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967). That constitutional
right to counsel requires representation by duly licensed attorneys seems to be generally
recognized under state court decisions. Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 1141 (1959). But court
provision of non-lawyer counsel on a voluntary acceptance basis (or to substitute for
lawyer counsel at disposition) could be accepted as a waiver of the right to an attorney.
See In re Custody of a Minor, 250 F.2d 419, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1957), where, in holding
that a court director of social work was in effect adequate counsel in a neglect pro-
ceeding, the court noted that the child was afforded "not only legal counsel experienced
in such matters but social and medical counsel as well."
104. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System; Problems of
Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7.
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particularly contested ones, will continue to require skills in which
lawyers are likely to excel. Conceding that the disposition determination
will continue as the only critical issue in the vast majority of delinquency
cases reaching the formal hearing stage, one can point to a significant,
albeit recent, movement in legal education to enhance the young lawyer's
competencies to participate in this area.1"' Accompanying this movement
has been a visible awakening of interest among law students in career
work in criminal law, family law, and related social problem areas. The
point to remember, as we seek to fashion juvenile court systems into more
effective instrumentalities, is that neither the Constitution nor juvenile
court doctrine demands an exclusive license for lawyers as "advocate" or
"counsel" in this forum. It might be unfortunate to fall to recognize this
in determining the bounds of future experimentation and inquiry.
CONCLUSION
Gault has affirmed what an increasing body of legal opinion has
contended ever since the Supreme Court determined that counsel was
constitutionally required for indigent accused in serious criminal cases-
that the right to counsel applied to juvenile offenders as well. The full
scope of the right in juvenile cases remains to be established but, follow-
ing adult analogies and recognizing the special disabilities of children
before law, a broad definition of the scope seems justified. Provision
of counsel will undoubtedly have an impact on the processes of juvenile
court justice and offer a challenge to the informal and therapeutic
orientation that has characterized the court since its inauguration. The
prospects for a satisfactory accommodation, however, are good and
there is at least the potential for enhancing not only the legal process in
juvenile courts, but the court's overall capacity for special help to children.
105. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY & YOUTH DEVELOPMENT, U.S. DE'T
oF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELF., THE ExTENsION OF LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR 165-90
(1964) ; Skoler, Law School Curriculum Coverage of Juvenile and Family Court
Subjects, 5 J. FAmY L. 74 (1965). Law school response has been matched, and
probably surpassed, by an intensive continuing education effort in the past decade to
enhance capabilities and meet in-service training needs of the nation's juvenile court
judges. See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, VENTURES IN JUDICIAL
EDUCATION 22 (1967) ; Rose & Skoler, Continuing Education for Juvenile Court Judges,
48 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 225 (1965).
